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At first blush, the subject matter of this paper would seem a
particularly anomalous topic for discussion at a conference de-
voted to the jurisprudence of the U.S. Court of International Trade
("CIT"). After all, among the some four thousand published deci-
sions the CIT has issued since its creation in 1980, relatively few
have involved causes of action predicated explicitly on the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act ("APA").1 One might reasonably ask why
we should bother devoting an entire panel discussion to an issue
that so infrequently commands the CIT's attention.
The first answer is that all is not as it seems, and the just-
quoted statistic regarding the frequency of APA claims at the CIT
is, in fact, misleading. Although very few complaints lodged un-
der the CIT's residual jurisdiction explicitly cite the APA as the ba-
sis for the plaintiff's cause of action, there is a compelling statutory
argument, supported by the Federal Circuit's recent en banc deci-
sion in Motion Systems Corp. v. Bush,2 that the overwhelming num-
ber of claims filed under the CIT's jurisdictional statute3 ("§
1581(i)") are necessarily predicated on the APA. The second an-
swer is that even if one were to take issue with that conclusion, it is
worth considering whether the increase in the number of high-
profile actions explicitly predicated on the APA in recent years re-
The authors are a partner and associate, respectively, at Steptoe & Johnson
LLP. The views expressed in this paper are entirely their own. Mr. Moran was
counsel of record for one of the parties in two of the cases discussed in this paper,
Tembec, Inc. v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006) [hereinafter
"Tembec I"] and Tembec, Inc. v. United States, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2006) [hereinafter "Tembec IH"], and Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance v. United States,
425 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006).
1 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2000).
2 Motion Sys. Corp. v. Bush, 437 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S.Ct. 69 (2006).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (2000).
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flects a potential structural change in the content of the Court's
docket, or rather is merely coincidental.
To address these issues, this paper first presents a brief statu-
tory analysis of the relationship between APA claims and the CIT's
§ 1581(i) jurisdiction, followed by a survey of the CIT's § 1581(i) ju-
risprudence and broad categorization of the types of complaints
invoking the Court's jurisdiction under that provision. This paper
then analyzes the recent cases in which APA claims have featured
prominently at the CIT, and closes with some thoughts regarding
to what degree, if any, these cases reflect a structural change in the
nature of claims likely to be brought before the CIT in the future.
1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CIT'S § 1581 (I) JURISDICTION
AND CLAIMS UNDER THE APA
Although it was assumed otherwise for many years, the Su-
preme Court settled in Califano v. Sanders4 that the APA does not
constitute an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to
challenge agency action in federal courts. Instead, the function of
the APA is to provide a limited waiver of sovereign immunity and
a cause of action for challenges to certain actions of federal admin-
istrative agencies and officials.
5
Section 702 of the APA provides, in relevant part, that "[a] per-
son suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 6 Section 704,
in turn, defines the scope of agency actions reviewable under the
APA: "Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are
subject to judicial review."
7
4 Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
5 See id. at 103-04 (showing that the Court of International Trade ("CIT") and
the Federal Circuit have frequently recognized this limitation of the APA); see also
PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 650, 655 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (dis-
cussing how the APA is not "designed to grant an independent basis for jurisdic-
tion .... Rather [it] provide[s] for additional remedies where jurisdiction has al-
ready been confirmed by statute."); Am. Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United
States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("The APA does not give an independ-
ent basis for finding jurisdiction in the Court of International Trade.") vacated sub
nom., E.C. McAfee Co. v. United States, 842 F.2d 314 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
6 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
7 Id. § 704.
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Although the Supreme Court has observed that the APA's
"'generous review provisions' must be given a 'hospitable' inter-
pretation,"8 the APA tends to serve a residual function inasmuch
as "Congress did not intend the general grant of review in the APA
to duplicate existing procedures for review of agency action."9
Therefore, in the context of CIT litigation, a cause of action predi-
cated on the APA would seem relevant only to the extent that the
various statutes referenced in § 1581 do not provide for judicial re-
view of the particular claim. In fact, with one exception, subsec-
tions (a)-(h) of § 1581 reference statutes that specifically provide
for judicial review by the CIT of the administrative determinations
or actions specified therein.10 The lone exception is § 1581(e),
which references section 305(b)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, a statu-
tory provision that makes no mention of judicial review at the CIT
or elsewhere. Claims arising under § 1581(e), therefore, presuma-
bly would have to be predicated upon the APA.u All other claims
filed under the CIT's specific jurisdictional grants in §§ 1581(a)-(h)
would thus be non-APA claims. Because the overwhelming major-
ity of cases brought before the CIT invoke the Court's jurisdiction
8 Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 904 (1988) (quoting Abbott Labs. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967)).
9 Id. at 903.
10 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2000) (providing that judicial review of the de-
nials of protests against Customs decisions is provided for by 19 U.S.C. § 1515(c)
(2000)); 28 U.S.C. § 1581(b) (providing that judicial review of the Secretary of
Treasury's determinations on petitions by domestic interested parties under sec-
tion 1516 is provided for by 19 U.S.C. § 1516(f) (2000)); 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (provid-
ing that judicial review of certain determinations under section 1516a is provided
for by 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(1) & (a)(2)); 28 U.S.C. § 1581(d) (providing that judicial
review of determinations of the Secretary of Labor under sections 223, 251, and
271 of the Trade Act of 1974 is provided for by 19 U.S.C. § 2395); 28 U.S.C. §
1581(f) (providing that judicial review of any civil action involving an application
for an order directing the Department of Commerce or International Trade Com-
mission to make confidential information available under section 777(c)(2) of the
Tariff Act of 1930 is provided for by 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(c)(2)); 28 U.S.C. § 1581(g)
(providing that judicial review of the Secretary of Treasury's determinations un-
der sections 641(b)(2) and (3), 641(c)(1), 641(b)(5) and (c)(2), and 641(d)(2)(B) of the
Tariff Act of 1930 is provided for by 19 U.S.C. § 1641(e) and judicial review of Cus-
toms' decisions under section 499(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 is provided by 19
U.S.C. § 1499(b)(2)); 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h) (providing that for judicial review of ac-
tions that would have been filed under section 515 of the Tariff Act had the ac-
tions been filed after the importation).
11 The authors" search revealed that no actions ever have been filed under 28
U.S.C. § 1581(e).
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under §§ 1581(a)-(h),12 the APA will necessarily be of limited rele-
vance in such cases.
13
In contrast to §§ 1581(a)-(h), § 1581(i) does not reference any
specific statutes; rather, it provides for "residual jurisdiction" by
the CIT of any action arising out of any law of the United States
that falls within enumerated categories and of any action arising
out of the administration and enforcement with respect to the mat-
ters referred to in §§ 1581(a)-(h).14 The "residual" nature of §
1581(i) indicates that it is intended to confer jurisdiction upon the
CIT where the CIT otherwise would not have jurisdiction under §§
1581(a)-(h).15 Since the APA is intended to provide a "residual"
12 The authors' tally using the CIT's Case Management / Electronic Case
Files ("CM/ECF") database showed that most cases before the CIT are brought
pursuant to §§ 1581(a)-(h). The CM/ECF System is an online database that allows
practitioners to electronically file or download pleadings and other court docu-
ments in the CIT proceedings. Three hundred twenty-one actions were com-
menced before the CIT in the first three quarters of 2006, nearly 80 percent of
which were filed under just two provisions: 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (showing 186
cases) and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (showing sixty-eight cases). See CM/ECF Database,
http://www.cit.uscourts.gov/cmecf/new-cm-ecf.htm.
13 The fact that the causes of action in cases brought under 28 U.S.C. §§
1581(a)-(h) are not predicated on the APA does not mean that the APA is wholly
irrelevant in such cases. In some instances, the CIT will be required to look to the
APA for the standard of review to apply. For example, in Harak v. United States,
No. 05-00365 (Ct. Int'l Trade July 18, 2006), the CIT held that the standard of re-
view of the APA is applicable to an action brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(g) be-
cause "the relevant statutes [19 U.S.C. § 1641(e)] are silent regarding the proper
standard of review in considering the legal questions in . . . [such] cases .....
Harak, slip op. at 8. The cause of action in Harak, however, arose under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1641, not the APA. In addition, the CIT's application of the "substantial evi-
dence" standard of review in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) cases naturally draws upon juris-
prudence regarding the analogous APA standard of review.
14 See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), which provides exclusive jurisdiction for:
any civil action commenced against the United States, its agencies, or its
officers, that arises out of any law of the United States providing for: (1)
revenue from imports or tonnage; (2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes
on the importation of merchandise for reasons other than the raising of
revenue; (3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importa-
tion of merchandise for reasons other than the protection of the public
health or safety; or (4) administration and enforcement with respect to
the matters referred to in paragraphs (1)-(3) of this subsection and sub-
sections (a)-(h) of this section.
15 See Miller & Co. v. United States, 824 F.2d 961, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("Sec-
tion 1581(i) jurisdiction may not be invoked when jurisdiction under another sub-
section of § 1581 is or could have been available, unless the r~medy provided un-
der that other subsection would be manifestly inadequate."); see also Abitibi-
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cause of action for challenges to agency action for which judicial
review is not otherwise provided by statute, it would seem to fol-
low that most claims heard by the CIT under § 1581(i) would have
to be predicated upon the APA.
This conclusion is reinforced by the statutory provisions gov-
erning standing and scope and standard of review in cases brought
before the CIT. First, a person seeking to bring a claim before the
CIT must satisfy the standing requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. §
2631.16 Each subsection of 2631 specifies the persons who have
standing to bring actions before the CIT under each corresponding
subsection of § 1581. With respect to actions brought under §
1581(i), § 2631(i) provides that "[a]ny civil action of which the
Court of International Trade has jurisdiction, other than an action
specified in subsections (a)-(h) of this section, may be commenced
in the court by any person adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of § 702 of title 5."17 In other
words, § 2631(i) allows any person who has standing to bring an
APA claim to bring an action under § 1581(i).
Second, 28 U.S.C. § 2640 specifies the scope and standard of re-
view for different actions brought before the CIT. Subsections (a)-
(d) of § 2640 set forth the scope and standard of review applicable
in actions brought under specific statutes, most of which are those
referenced in §§ 1581(a)-(h). Section 2640(e) further states that
"[i]n any civil action not specified in this section, the Court of In-
ternational Trade shall review the matter as provided in section
706 of title 5." 18 Since actions brought under § 1581(i) are not speci-
fied in § 2640, the scope and standard of review provided for by
the APA under 5 U.S.C. § 706 will apply to actions brought under §
1581(i).
Emerging from the foregoing statutory analysis is a scheme
under which (1) persons who have standing to bring APA claims
are deemed to have standing to bring claims under the CIT's §
Consol. Inc. v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1356 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006) (cit-
ing Miller & Co. v. United States, 824 F.2d 961 (Fed. Cir. 1987)) ("The shorthand
rule provides that the Court's residual jurisdiction under section 1581(i) attaches
only if a remedy under another section of 1581 is unavailable or 'manifestly in-
adequate.'").
16 28 U.S.C. § 2631.
17 Id. § 2631(i).
18 Id. § 2640(e).
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1581(i) jurisdiction; and (2) the scope and standard of review estab-
lished by the APA are applicable to claims brought under the CIT's
§ 1581(i) jurisdiction. The parallel residual nature of both § 1581(i)
and the APA, with the former providing for "residual" jurisdiction
and the latter providing for "residual" causes of action, strongly
suggests that Congress intended the APA to be the principal basis
for causes of action asserted under § 1581(i).
Early decisions of the CIT support this view. In Royal Business
Machines, Inc. v. United States,19 the CIT observed that
it is not difficult to foresee that certain grievances may arise
between the final determinations and the administrative
review of the final determinations, under 19 U.S.C. § 1675
for which 19 U.S.C. § 1516a would be manifestly inade-
quate. In those instances, the right of action under 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 [(the APA)] and the Court's broad residual jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) will serve to maintain the
comprehensive system of judicial review established by the
legislature. 20
Similarly, in Sacilor, Acieries et Laminoirs de Lorraine v. United
States,21 the Court found that the domestic industry's attempt to
invoke the Court's residual jurisdiction under § 1581(i) to prevent
the Commerce Department from disclosing its confidential infor-
mation was a "conventional challenge to final agency action by an
aggrieved party, within the meaning of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act ... "22
For its part, the Federal Circuit long has recognized that
"[ujnder section 1581(i), the Court of International Trade may con-
duct review under the general authority of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, but only when review would
never be available under one of the other subsections of 28 U.S.C. §
19 Royal Bus. Machs., Inc. v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 1007 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1980), affd, 669 F.2d 692 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
20 Id. at 1015.
21 Sacilor, Acieries et Laminoirs de Lorraine v. United States, 542 F. Supp.
1020, 1023 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
22 Id. at 1023; see also Krupp Stahl AG v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 394, 396
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1982) ("In the area of antidumping and countervailing duties, as in
other areas involving the administration of the tariff laws, if a proper action arises
under the Administrative Procedure Act or elsewhere, it is clear that this Court
has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) .... ).
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1581, or when the remedy afforded by the other subsections would
be 'manifestly inadequate."' 23
A recent en banc decision of the Federal Circuit in Motion Sys-
tems Corp. v. Bush24 seems to support the view that claims heard by
the CIT under its § 1581(i) jurisdiction must be predicated on the
APA or so-called "nonstatutory review." 25 In Motion Systems, the
plaintiff challenged the President's determination not to grant im-
port relief to the domestic pedestal actuator industry under § 421
of the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000. The CIT concluded that it
had jurisdiction to review plaintiff's claims under § 1581(i), and re-
viewed the President's decision to determine whether his actions
involved a "'clear misconstruction of the governing statute, a sig-
nificant procedural violation, or action outside delegated author-
ity."' 26 Applying this standard of review to the President's actions,
the CIT found no basis for plaintiff's claim and granted summary
judgment for the government.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT's result, but not
its rationale. The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that
"[tihere is no explicit statutory cause of action granting a petitioner
who is denied import relief under section 421 the right to sue the
President and the Trade Representative in the Court of Interna-
tional Trade." 27 Thus, the Federal Circuit continued, "Motions Sys-
tems has only two potential sources for relief: (1) the Administra-
tive Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 701; or (2) some form of
nonstatutory review." 28 The plaintiff conceded that the APA was
23 Shakeproof Indus. Prods. Div. of Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. United States, 104
F.3d 1309, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
24 Motion Sys. Corp. v. Bush, 437 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 69 (2006).
25 According to a leading treatise, nonstatutory review procedures "are pro-
cedures which, although governed by statute, are general remedies rather than
those which arise as specific relief pursuant to an agency statute .... [E]xamples
[of nonstatutory review remedies] include [mandamus], habeas corpus, injunc-
tions, declaratory relief, and prohibition.... [T]hese procedures are [only] reme-
dies, not jurisdictional grants, and ... only the statute governing mandamus in-
cludes a grant of jurisdiction in order to apply the remedy beyond its traditional
jurisdiction in the District of Columbia." JACOB A. STEIN, GLENN A. MITCHELL &
BASIL J. MEZINES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 45.01, 45-12 to -14 (2006).
26 Motion Sys. Corp. v. Bush, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1254-60 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2004) (citation omitted) affd, 437 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 69
(2006).
27 Motion Systems, 437 F.3d at 1359.
28 Id.
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unavailable because the President is not an "agency" under the
APA, thus leaving it to "resort to some form of nonstatutory re-
view as its only potential source for relief."29 The Federal Circuit
concluded that the President's action was nonreviewable because
the allegedly violated statute committed the decision to the discre-
tion of the President, and there was "no colorable claim" that the
President had exceeded his statutory authority.
30
Implicit in the Federal Circuit's analysis is that § 1581(i), al-
though granting the CIT jurisdiction, does not itself establish a
cause of action and that plaintiffs must look to the APA or else-
where when seeking review under that provision. In a lengthy and
vigorous concurrence, Judge Gajarsa, joined by Judge Newman,
took strong exception to the majority's conclusion that the Presi-
dent's decision was nonreviewable, and reached the merits of the
case, reviewing the President's actions employing the same defer-
ential standard of review the CIT had used. In the concurring
judges' view, in enacting § 1581(i), Congress intended the Presi-
dent to fall within the category of "officers" identified in the stat-
ute, thus authorizing judicial review of Presidential action under
trade statutes such as the United States-China Relations Act of
200031 pursuant to nonstatutory review claims.32 Prior to Motion
Systems, the Federal Circuit had held in Humane Society of the United
States v. Clinton that § 1581(i) "not only states the jurisdictional
grant to the Court of International Trade, but also provides a
waiver of sovereign immunity over the specified classes of cases."
33
At least one judge of the CIT had interpreted this statement in Hu-
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1360. As for the USTR, the Federal Circuit summarily concluded that
"because the acts of the Trade Representative were not final actions, the Court of
International Trade also lacked jurisdiction to review those acts." Id. at 1362. The
Federal Circuit did not cite § 704 of the APA's requirement that only "final agency
action" be reviewable for this conclusion. 5 U.S.C. § 704. Nonetheless, by focus-
ing on the lack of finality of the USTR's actions as a bar to judicial review, the
court was implicitly acknowledging that the plaintiff was raising an APA cause of
action in its claim against the USTR, who otherwise properly would have been
subject to suit as an "officer" of the United States within the meaning of § 1581(i).
31 United States-China Relations Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6901-7002 (2000).
32 Motion Sys. Corp., 437 F.3d at 1362-76 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
33 Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Clinton, 236 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
accord Corus Group PLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 352 F.3d 1351, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
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mane Society as arguably standing for the proposition that § 1581(i)
provides a cause of action independent of the APA.34
At bottom, whether § 1581(i) itself creates a cause of action or
instead requires claims heard under the CIT's residual jurisdiction
to be predicated upon the APA or some form of nonstatutory re-
view is of little practical import, except in cases challenging the ac-
tions of the President under discretionary trade statutes where the
Supreme Court has held the APA to be inapplicable. If § 1581(i)
were deemed to provide a separate cause of action, and if the
President were properly considered an "officer" under that provi-
sion, then the fact that § 1581(i) created an independent cause of ac-
tion would have significance in that very limited class of disputes.
But since the Federal Circuit has resolved these questions in the
negative, the potential distinction now would seem to be largely
academic. Nonetheless, considering the statutory analysis pre-
sented above, there is a strong case to be made for the proposition
that virtually all § 1581(i) claims against agencies or officers other
than the President have been and must be predicated upon the
APA.
2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SECTION 1581(i) CLAIMS BEFORE THE CIT
There have been very few cases decided by the CIT where the
parties or the Court explicitly stated that the cause of action arose
under the APA. Prior to 2004, in the more than two decades fol-
lowing the CIT's creation, only a handful of published decisions
explicitly identified the plaintiff's cause of action as being predi-
cated upon the APA.35 In the past three years, the number of such
34 In Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd. v. United States, 403 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 n.3
(Ct. Int'l Trade 2005), the court wrote:
The complaint invokes this court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)
but does not assert that its [cause of] action arises solely thereunder. See,
e.g., Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Clinton, 236 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (stating that § 1581 is both a waiver of sovereign immunity and a
grant of jurisdiction). Construing the complaint as alleging a cause of ac-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1581 would not overcome the jurisdictional short-
comings arising from the lack of ripeness and the potential availability of
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) ....
35 For examples of cases pleading the APA, see, e.g., Shinyei Corp. of Am. v.
United States, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003) (challenging Commerce's
liquidation instructions), rev'd, 355 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Friedman v. Kantor,
977 F. Supp. 1242 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997) (seeking to compel United States agencies
to assist plaintiff, a potential importer of merchandise, with his business difficul-
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cases has increased, but still very few cases before the CIT plead
APA causes of action.36 In a few more, where the plaintiff did not
indicate the basis for its claim, the CIT has inferred sua sponte that it
arose under the APA. 37 Although many more cases implicate the
ties in Mexico), affd sub nom. Friedman v. Daley, 156 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Brown, 920 F. Supp. 178 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996) (seek-
ing enforcement of High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act with respect to
Italy), affd sub nom. Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Clinton, 236 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Nakajima All Co. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 52 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988)
(seeking to direct Commerce to complete and publish various preliminary and
final administrative review results in an antidumping duty investigation); Nat'l
Coin Growers Ass'n v. Baker, 643 F. Supp. 626 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) (challenging
Customs' classification of certain imported ethanol brands from Brazil), rev'd, 840
F.2d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Bonanza Trucking Corp. v. United States, 642 F. Supp.
1170 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) (challenging Customs' decision to revoke plaintiff's
Customs licenses); Sacilor, Acieries et Laminoirs de Lorraine v. United States, 542
F. Supp. 1020 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982) (seeking to enjoin Commerce from disclosing
confidential information that producers had submitted in response to question-
naires in antidumping investigations).
36 See, generally Tembec, I, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006) (chal-
lenging USTR's authority to trump a negative ITC determination issued pursuant
to binational panel review by implementing an ITC affirmative determination is-
sued under Section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act), amended by Tem-
bec II, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006); Shandong Huarong Mach. Co. v.
United States, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006) (challenging, among oth-
ers, Commerce's liquidation instructions for failure to include instructions regard-
ing a particular product); Abitibi-Consol. Inc. v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 2d
1352 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006) (challenging Commerce's use of sampling in selecting
respondents in an antidumping duty administrative review); Can. Lumber Trade
Alliance v. United States, 425 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006) (challenging
Customs' distribution of antidumping and countervailing duties collected from
imports of goods from Canada pursuant to the Byrd Amendment); Auto Alliance
Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2005) (challenging
Customs' imposition of a value advance on plaintiff's entries); Int'l Labor Rights
Fund v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1370 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2005) (challeng-
ing the "federal government's failure to investigate allegation that cocoa imported
from Cote d'Ivoire had been produced by forced child labor."); Int'l Custom Prod.
v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2005) (challenging Customs'
reclassification of and imposition of a rate advance on plaintiff's entries), rev'd in
part and vacated in part, 467 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Gilda Indus. v. United
States, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004) (challenging USTR's compilation
and administration of WTO retaliation list)., affd in part and vacated in part, 446
F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
37 See, e.g. Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 1287 (interpreting § 1581
to provide a cause of action independent of the APA); Int'l Custom Prods. v.
United States, No. 05-00509, slip op. 05-145 (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 8, 2005) (discuss-
ing relief for single entry bonds entering into the U.S.); Jilin Henghe Pharm. Co. v.
United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004) (challenging Commerce's
liquidation instructions), vacating as moot, 123 Fed. Appx. 402 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In
Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, for instance, the CIT observed:
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APA, it is only by virtue of plaintiffs' referring to the APA in their
standing and standard of review arguments, not because they
identify the APA as the basis for their claim. 38
These statistics are misleading if one accepts the premise set
forth in the preceding section, i.e., that with the exception of so-
called "nonstatutory review" claims, all claims heard by the CIT
under its § 1581(i) jurisdiction necessarily arise under the APA. If
that conclusion is correct, then tracing the history of APA claims
before the CIT is tantamount to tracing the history of § 1581(i)
claims before the CIT.
Although considerably less frequent than actions under §§
1581(a)-(h), actions commenced under § 1581(i) are not rare. A
search of LexisNexis' CIT database reveals that since 1980, there
have been more than 160 published CIT opinions in which the par-
ties asserted, and the CIT determined, that it had jurisdiction under
§ 1581(i).39 The subject matters of these § 1581(i) cases, due to the
"catch-all" nature of § 1581(i), are wide-ranging. Nevertheless, a
rough categorization can be attempted as follows:
(1) twenty-two cases involved challenges in antidumping and
countervailing duty proceedings to the liquidation instructions is-
sued by the Department of Commerce or to the assessment of du-
ties or imposition of cash deposits;40
The complaint does not state expressly that plaintiffs are suing under the
APA, but it relies on this provision in its allegation of standing.... The
complaint does not appear to plead a civil action against the United
States under any other statute. Accordingly, for purposes of considering
defendant's motion to dismiss, the court will construe the complaint to
bring an action under the APA.
Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 1292 (citation omitted) (footnote omit-
ted).
38 See, e.g., Mittal Can., Inc. v. United States, No. 05-00689, slip op. 2006-143
(Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 22, 2006); SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1355
(Ct. Int'l Trade 2006).
39 In 2006 alone, there were forty-eight § 1581(i) cases filed with the CIT ac-
cording to a tally by the authors using the CM/ECF database of the CIT. This
number is overstated somewhat in light of the fifteen complaints raising identical
issues that have been consolidated in West Fraser Mills Ltd. v. United States, Consol.
Ct. No. 06-00157 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006) available at http://www.cit.uscourts.gov/
mecf/new-cm-ecf.htm.
40 See, e.g., Mukand Int'l, Ltd. v. United States, 452 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2006) (challenging Commerce's liquidation instructions); J.S. Stone, Inc. v.
United States, 297 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003) (seeking refund for the
difference between the cash deposit rate the exporter received and the published
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(2) eighteen cases sought to enjoin the initiation or continuation
of antidumping or countervailing duty proceedings; 41
(3) four cases challenged the Department of Commerce's deci-
sion either to disclose or withhold certain business proprietary in-
formation in antidumping duty proceedings;42
(4) eight cases challenged the Byrd Amendment or its imple-
mentation;43
(5) sixty-eight cases challenged the actions of Customs in mat-
ters involving entry bonds, collection of taxes, and other miscella-
neous Customs issues;44 and
(6) forty-one cases were challenges against the determinations
or actions of other federal agencies or departments, such as the
USTR, the Department of Interior, and the President of the United
rate determined for the exporter), affd, 111 Fed. Appx. 611 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Ce-
ramica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States, 557 F. Supp. 596 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983)
(seeking to direct Commerce to reduce estimated countervailing duty cash deposit
rate).
41 See, e.g., Dofasco Inc. v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2004) (unsuccessfully seeking to enjoin the Department of Commerce from con-
tinuing an antidumping duty administrative review), affd, 390 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2004); NEC Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 978 F. Supp. 314 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1997) (seeking unsuccessfully to enjoin the Department of Commerce from initiat-
ing an antidumping duty investigation).
42 See, e.g., Daido Corp. v. United States, 807 F. Supp. 1571 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1992) (seeking to compel the Department of Commerce to disclose certain confi-
dential information in an antidumping duty administrative review); Hyundai
Pipe Co. v. United States, No. 87-03-00535 (Ct. Int'l Trade Apr. 1, 1987) (seeking to
enjoin the Department of Commerce from disclosing certain business proprietary
information in an antidumping duty administrative review).
43 See, e.g., SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2006) (challenging the Byrd Amendment as violating the First Amendment, Due
Process, and Equal Protection guarantees of the Constitution); PS Chez Sidney
L.L.C. v. U. S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006)
(challenging the Byrd Amendment as violating the First Amendment and Equal
Protection guarantees of the Constitution); Can. Lumber Trade Alliance v. United
States, 425 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006) (challenging Customs' collection
and distribution of antidumping and countervailing duties collected from duty
orders on imports from Canada and Mexico as violating the NAFTA Implementa-
tion Act).
44 See, e.g., Int'l Custom Prod. v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2005) (challenging the single entry bonds imposed by Customs on im-
porter's entries); Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2002) (challenging the assessment and collection by Customs of the
Harbor Maintenance Tax on passenger cruise ships), affd, 397 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
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States.45
If the analysis set forth in this paper is correct, then virtually all
of the claims raised in these cases against agencies and officers
other than the President necessarily were predicated upon the
APA, even though very few explicitly cited the APA as the basis
for their cause of action. The fact that the number of CIT actions
explicitly pleading APA claims in the past few years has increased,
thus, would not seem nearly as indicative of a possible trend in
pleading before the CIT as it otherwise might suggest. Nonethe-
less, it is worth reviewing some of these recent CIT cases in which
the plaintiffs' claims were predicated upon the APA to evaluate
whether any trend is evident.
3. A REVIEW OF RECENT SIGNIFICANT TRADE-RELATED CASES
UNDER SECTION 1581(i)
3.1. Shinyei Corp. of America v. United States 46 and CIT Cases
Interpreting Its Reach
Shinyei involved an APA challenge to Department of Com-
merce liquidation instructions that failed to reflect the amended fi-
nal results of an administrative review following a CIT challenge.
Shinyei initially filed a complaint with the CIT seeking a writ of
45 See, e.g., U.S. Ass'n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel v. United States, 366 F.
Supp. 2d 1280 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2005) (seeking review of a decision of the Commit-
tee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements to accept "threat-based" re-
quests pursuant to its rules governing consideration of public requests for safe-
guards on Chinese textile and apparel imports); Defenders of Wildlife v. Hogarth,
177 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001) (challenging administrative determina-
tions made by the Secretaries of Commerce, State, and Treasury, as well as the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to implement the 1997 Interna-
tional Dolphin Conservation Program Act), affd, 330 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Clinton, 44 F. Supp. 2d 260 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999)
(seeking to direct defendant President to impose sanctions on Italy for illegal
driftnet fishing in violation of the Driftnet Act and to enjoin defendant Secretary
of Commerce to rescind his certification of Italy), affd, 236 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Timex V.I., Inc. v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 1345 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997)
(challenging a decision by the Secretaries of Commerce and of the Interior affirm-
ing a decision by the Director of the Statutory Import Programs Staff of the De-
partment of Commerce denying plaintiff a production incentive certificate), rev'd,
157 F.3d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
46 See Shinyei Corp. of Am. V. United States, 355 F.3d 1297, 1297 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (holding, inter alia, that the "statutory protest provision did not preclude re-
lief in form of reliquidation").
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mandamus directing the Department of Customs to liquidate its
entries at the rate established in the final results, or alternatively a
declaration that Commerce's instructions were in violation of 19
U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2), and an order remanding to Commerce to issue
correct instructions. Shinyei did not seek a preliminary injunction
against liquidation pending a final decision of the CIT. While
Shinyei's complaint was pending, its entries were liquidated at the
"as entered" rates, which were considerably higher than those es-
tablished in the final review results. Shinyei then amended its
complaint to allege legal error only on the part of Commerce, argu-
ing that the instructions that led to liquidation were in violation of
19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2). The CIT granted the United States' motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds
that Shinyei's claim was rendered moot by the liquidation of its en-
tries.47
Upon appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed. Relying on its ear-
lier decision in Consolidated Bearings Co. v. United States,48 the Fed-
eral Circuit concluded that § 1581(i)(4) provided the CIT with ju-
risdiction over the case because Shinyei's action challenged
Commerce's liquidation instructions under Section 702 of the APA,
not the underlying final results of the administrative review.
49
Turning to the merits, the Court first rejected the CIT's holding that
it was stripped of jurisdiction once the entries were liquidated be-
cause section 516A of the Tariff Act50 (and cases interpreting that
provision, such as Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States51) prohibited
reliquidation. The Federal Circuit acknowledged that Zenith stood
for the proposition that section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930 "'has
no provision permitting reliquidation'" and " that '[o]nce liquida-
tion occurs, a subsequent decision by the trial court on the merits
of [plaintiff's] challenge can have no effect on the dumping duties
assessed on [plaintiff's] entries.' ' 52 However, the Federal Circuit
dismissed its relevance to the case at bar because it was an "action
under the APA challenging Commerce instructions as in violation
47 Shinyei Corp. of Am. v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2003), rev'd, 355 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
48 Consol. Bearings Co. v. United States, 348 F.3d 997 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
49 Shinyei, 355 F.3d at 1305.
50 See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1654 (1930).
51 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 710 F.2d 806 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
52 Shinyei, 355 F.3d at 1308 (quoting Zenith, 710 F.2d at 810).
[Vol. 28:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol28/iss1/2
APA CLAIMS BEFORE THE CIT
of section 1675(a)(2)(C); section 516A simply does not apply." 53
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit dismissed the CIT's concern that
allowing Shinyei's case to proceed would encourage parties to
"'sleep on their rights"' by permitting liquidation to occur, only to
try and use § 1581(i) jurisdiction to revive otherwise moot claims.54
The Court refused to accept the characterization that Shinyei had
slept on its rights, and "reject[ed] the notion that Shinyei was
somehow required to seek an injunction to preserve its rights. ...
[I]ts suit was not brought under section 516A of the Tariff Act, and
the injunction provisions of that statute were not available to it."55
The Federal Circuit also rejected the government's alternative
argument that reliquidation was authorized under the statute only
through the protest process set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a). Ac-
cording to the Court, § 1514(a) only governed decisions of Cus-
toms, and could not be "fairly construed to prohibit reliquidation
in all cases, particularly when the alleged error is with Commerce
instructions as in violation of § 1675(a)(2)(C) ."... 56 It rejected the
suggestion that the "statute's silence as to reliquidation in the con-
text of Commerce error can be construed as a prohibition of reliq-
uidation in such cases," and declined "to find that the statute as a
whole was intended to preclude judicial enforcement of court or-
ders after liquidation."5 7 For both of these reasons, the Federal Cir-
cuit reversed and remanded the case to the CIT with instructions to
address Shinyei's claim on the merits.
The Federal Circuit's decision in Shinyei has the potential to be
of far reaching significance. By questioning whether its prior hold-
ing in Zenith was applicable to jurisdiction rulings at all, and in any
event limiting its reach in such a context to the liquidation and in-
junction provisions of § 516A, the Court fundamentally altered
what most practitioners and CIT judges as well had concluded was
settled law for two decades-namely, that the liquidation of entries
mooted an underlying challenge in virtually any context. The fear
of inadvertent or mistaken (let alone unlawful) liquidation pending
a CIT challenge has led counsel for many parties to seek consent
injunctions at the outset of CIT litigation to protect their rights pre-
53 Shinyei, 355 F.3d at 1309.
54 Id. (quoting Shinyei, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 1360).
55 Id. at 1309-10.
56 Id. at 1311.
57 Id. at 1312.
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cisely because of the legion of cases holding that liquidation moots
out a cause of action. Although it is too soon to tell whether the
decision will substantially affect the strategic choices of litigants
seeking redress before the CIT, the reasoning in Shinyei, with its
emphasis on the APA and the broad remedial powers of the CIT,
clearly opens the door for parties to consider new avenues for con-
fronting unlawful agency action in connection with the ubiquitous
area of Commerce instructions to Customs in the trade remedy
context. Two CIT cases interpreting Shinyei provide some insight
into the reach that decision may have in the future.
In Jilin Henghe Pharmaceutical Co. v. United States,58 plaintiffs' en-
tries were subject to an antidumping duty order that later was in-
validated by the CIT. Commerce nonetheless instructed Customs
to liquidate entries made prior to the "Timken" notice of the con-
trary court decision at the rate specified in the invalidated deter-
mination. Plaintiff challenged Commerce's liquidation instructions
as unlawful and initially sought a writ of mandamus requiring
Commerce to issue new instructions to Customs to liquidate with-
out duties, which the Court and parties subsequently agreed to
treat as motion for declaratory relief.
The CIT first held that it had jurisdiction over the action under
§ 1581(j),59 citing Shinyei.60 The CIT then addressed the govern-
ment's argument that absent an injunction against liquidation, §§
1516a(c)(1) and 1516a(e) required entries remaining unliquidated at
the time of the "Timken" notice to be liquidated at the cash-deposit
rate, rather than in accordance with the Court's decision. Relying
on its earlier decision in Laclede Steel Co. v. United States,61 the CIT
rejected this reading of the statutory provisions but also went on to
"evaluate the situation anew," in light of the Federal Circuit deci-
sion in Shinyei.62 That case, the CIT concluded, held that Com-
merce instructions must pass muster under the APA, and, under
58 Jilin Henghe Pharm. Co. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1309-10
(Ct. Int'l Trade 2004) (holding that once Commerce's final antidumping determi-
nation has been invalidated, it cannot serve as a legal basis for the imposition of
antidumping duties on Plaintiffs' entries)., vacated, 123 Fed. Appx. 402 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
59 Id. at 1304.
60 Shinyei, 355 F.3d at 1312.
61 Laclede Steel Co. v. United States, 928 F. Supp. 1182 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996),
affd mem., 92 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
62 Jilin, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1309.
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the APA standard of review, "an agency action must be 'in accor-
dance with law,"' and "law" for this purpose includes not only
statutes but "a binding court decision."63 The CIT found that the
liquidation instructions at issue in Jilin were not in accordance with
law because they did not reflect the Court's prior determination
invalidating the underlying antidumping duty order. The Court
also held that 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(c)(1) and 1516a(e) "cannot be
read to legitimate the liquidation of Jilin's entries under Com-
merce's now discredited determination. To read the statutory pro-
visions in that way fails to give force and effect to this Court's deci-
sions, in that it allows liquidations to continue under a legally
invalid determination." 64 Finally, the Court held that "because this
action is predicated upon the APA, the Court need not look to 19
U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(2) alone in search of a remedy," 65 and granted de-
claratory relief in favor of Jilin.66
If Jilin is perceived as embracing unqualifiedly the Federal Cir-
cuit's reasoning in Shinyei, the CIT's subsequent decision in Mu-
kand International, Ltd v. United States67 arguably reflects a narrow
application of that case.68 In Mukand, the plaintiff's entries were
subject to an antidumping duty order on Stainless Steel Bar from
India ("SSB Order"). Mukand did not participate in the first ad-
ministrative review of the order, but filed an untimely question-
naire response in the second administrative review, leading to an
adverse facts available rate. While the administrative reviews were
ongoing, Mukand began importing SSB produced in the United
Arab Emirates ("UAE") using Stainless Steel Wire Rod ("SSWR")
from India, and submitted a scope ruling request to Commerce
seeking clarification as to whether its entries of SSB produced in
UAE using SSWR from India were subject to the SSB Order. Al-
though Commerce ultimately concluded that they were not, it
failed to initiate the scope inquiry or issue a ruling until two years
63 Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1310.
66 Id.
67 Mukand Int'l, Ltd. v. United States, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2005) aff d, No. 2006-1259, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 2520 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 6, 2007).
68 Id. at 1318-19 (holding narrowly that "that importer's failure to obtain pre-
liminary injunction, preventing liquidation of its entries pending completion of its
requested scope ruling, deprived court of subject matter jurisdiction to grant any
post-liquidation relief").
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after Mukand's initial request.69
Prior to issuing the scope ruling, Commerce instructed Cus-
toms to liquidate Mukand's entries following the completion of the
second administrative review, including its entries of SSB pro-
duced in UAE using SSWR from India, pursuant to the rate estab-
lished based on adverse facts available. After Customs liquidated
Mukand's entries, Mukand filed a protest with Customs, which
was denied. Mukand then filed a complaint against Commerce
with the CIT under § 1581(i), seeking a writ of mandamus to com-
pel Commerce to issue a scope determination, suspend any further
liquidation and refund duties paid on imports of SSB from UAE. 70
The CIT first examined whether it had jurisdiction to hear Mu-
kand's claim under § 1581(i). Resurrecting positions that had been
rejected in Shinyei, the government argued that the Court lacked
jurisdiction under § 1581(i) because Mukand could have brought
its action under § 1581(a), and because liquidation was final under
§ 1514(a).71 The CIT easily rejected these arguments, noting that
"Mukand's challenge to Commerce's compliance with its regula-
tory procedures for reviewing scope determinations is not an ac-
tion available to Mukand under § 1581(a)," 72 and that "Customs'
implementing decision was not a protestable decision within the
meaning of § 1514...."73
The CIT nonetheless concluded that it was precluded from re-
viewing Mukand's claim for reliquidation.74 Somewhat surpris-
ingly, the CIT began its analysis by citing the Federal Circuit's de-
cision in Zenith75 and the CIT's decision in Mitsubishi Electronics
Am., Inc. v. United States for the proposition that once liquidation
occurs, the cause of action is moot because the entries are outside
the court's jurisdiction. 76 These, of course, were the very two deci-
69 See id. at 1313-14 (explaining the factual background of the case).
70 See id. (describing the facts as set forth in the case).
71 See id. at 1315-16 (summarizing generally the court's position and the hold-
ing in the case).
72 Id. at 1316.
73 Id. at 1317.
74 Id.
75 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 710 F.2d 806 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
76 See Mitsubishi Electonics Am., Inc. v. United States, 848 F. Supp 193 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1994), affd on other grounds, 44 F.3d 973, 977 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding
that failure to seek an injunction before liquidation resulted in the court having no
jurisdiction over the complaint).
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sions the Federal Circuit found inapplicable in Shinyei to a chal-
lenge to Commerce's liquidation instructions under § 1581(i).
Based on the reasoning in those two decisions, however, the CIT
held that Mukand's failure to "seek injunctive relief prior to the
liquidation of its entries of SSB from UAE preclude[d] the Court
from exercising ... jurisdiction to consider its refund request."77
The CIT distinguished Shinyei on the grounds that the plaintiff
in that case had not slept on his rights, while "Mukand filed an ap-
plication for a scope ruling request, but failed to seek an injunction
pending a Commerce scope ruling, even after it become [sic] clear
that its entries would be liquidated before Commerce re-
sponded." 78 The CIT's concern regarding the potential for claims
such as that of Mukand's to undermine the efficiency of the admin-
istrative and judicial processes is legitimate, and it reflects a robust
body of jurisprudence in the CIT and Federal Circuit.79 In the Au-
thors' view, however, the CIT's focus on the diligence of plaintiffs
in pursuing their rights and administrative efficiency was irrele-
vant to its holding that it lacked jurisdiction over Mukand's action
and disregarded the Federal Circuit's reasoning in Shinyei, ques-
tioning whether Zenith applied to questions of jurisdiction at all, let
alone its conclusion that "[n]either section 516A nor Zenith can be
read to preclude reliquidation in actions brought under the APA
seeking corrected [liquidation] instructions," in circumstances
where the allegation is that Commerce failed to comply with its or-
ganic statute.80
The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT's decision on appeal, al-
though effectively on other grounds.81 The Federal Circuit began
its analysis by noting that "the parties interpret the trial court's de-
cision as dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction based on
Customs' liquidation of the subject entries." 82 Surprisingly, the
77 Mukand, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1317.
78 Id. at 1319.
79 The CIT relied heavily on the Federal Circuit's decision in Sandvik Steel Co.
v. United States, 164 F.3d 596, 600 (Fed. Cir. 1998) in support of its conclusion that
allowing Mukand to proceed with its claim would impair "the twin purposes" of
administrative exhaustion, i.e., protecting administrative agency authority and
promoting judicial efficiency. Mukand, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
80 Shinyei Corp. of Am. v. United States, 355 F.3d 1297, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
81 Mukand Int'l, Ltd. v. United States, No. 2006-1259, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
2520 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 6, 2007).
82 Id. at *7.
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Federal Circuit disagreed with the parties' shared understanding
of the CIT's holding and instead interpreted it as "a ruling on the
merits of the mandamus petition."83 Significantly, however, the
Federal Circuit went on to clarify that even if it were mistaken, its
recent decision in Shinyei "makes clear that the effect of liquidation
under the injunction and liquidation provisions of section 516A
does not divest the Court of International Trade of section
1581(i)(4) jurisdiction over an otherwise proper action for reliqui-
dation. The trial court therefore had jurisdiction to consider the
merits of this mandamus action."84 On the merits, the Federal Cir-
cuit held that Mukand was not entitled to the "drastic and extraor-
dinary remedy" of mandamus because it had failed to pursue al-
ternative remedies, including filing a § 1581(i) action seeking
injunctive relief against Commerce prior to liquidation.85 While
confirming that Shinyei stood for the proposition that failure to
seek injunctive relief prior to liquidation did not divest the CIT of
jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit distinguished Shinyei as an instance
where the plaintiff had availed itself of alternative remedies prior
to liquidation, including by filing a mandamus action.86
The Federal Circuit's decision in Mukand is important in two
respects. First, it unqualifiedly confirms the holding in Shinyei that
notwithstanding the seminal decision in Zenith that liquidation di-
vests the CIT of jurisdiction in §§ 1581(a) and (c) cases, it does not
do so in reliquidation actions brought under § 1581(i)(4). After
Mukand, there no longer can be any question whether the CIT pos-
sesses jurisdiction to hear properly pled reliquidation claims. Sec-
ond, it may reflect a warning to plaintiffs not to interpret the Fed-
eral Circuit's willingness to interpret § 1581(i)'s jurisdictional reach
broadly to encompass reliquidation claims as an indication that it
has a similarly expansive attitude towards the merits of such
claims. Indeed, Mukand suggests that a plaintiff assumes consider-
able risk that a reliquidation claim will be rejected on the merits if
it was in a position to seek injunctive or other relief prior to liqui-
dation, but failed to do so.
83 Id.
84 Id. at *7-*8.
85 Id. at *8.
86 Id. at *9-*11.
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3.2. Tembec, Inc. v. United States 87
This consolidated case presented the CIT with important ques-
tions of first impression relating to the authority of USTR to give
domestic law effect to ITC affirmative determinations issued in re-
sponse to adverse rulings by the World Trade Organization and
the effect of NAFTA binational panel decisions leading to the in-
validation of antidumping and countervailing duty orders. Plain-
tiffs' complaints first challenged the authority of USTR to imple-
ment an affirmative ITC injury determination issued under § 129 of
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act ("URAA").88 USTR had or-
dered Commerce to implement the ITC § 129 determination not-
withstanding the ITC's prior issuance of a negative determination
following binational panel review, and Commerce relied on the
implemented determination to maintain the antidumping and
countervailing duty orders on softwood lumber. Plaintiffs also
challenged the government's position that 19 U.S.C. §
1516a(g) (5) (B) required Commerce to liquidate all pre-Timken no-
tice entries on the basis of the invalidated orders, even though all
entries remained suspended by operation of law.89
The CIT concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction over
the case under § 1581(i), as plaintiffs were challenging the admini-
stration and enforcement of the ITC § 129 determination, not the
substance of the § 129 determination itself.90 It then addressed
whether Congress had authorized a private right of action to chal-
lenge USTR's interpretation of § 129, beginning with the well es-
tablished principle that "[u]nder the APA, courts presume a pri-
vate right of action is available absent 'any indication in the statute
that the [agency] decision is committed wholly to the discretion of
the agency or that review is otherwise precluded."' 91 The Court
then turned to the government's claim that this presumption was
87 Tembec I, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1302 and Tembec II, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2006).
88 19 U.S.C. § 3538(a) (1995). See also Tembec 1., 441 F. Supp. 2d at 1311
("Plaintiff Tembec filed a summons and complaint in this Court on January 19,
2005, alleging under section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") that
the USTR's action ordering Commerce to implement the Section 129 Determina-
tion was not in accordance with law.")
89 See Tembec II, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1355.
90 Tembec 1, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 1317-18.
91 Id. at 1318 (quoting Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778 (1983)).
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overcome in the case at bar because Congress had barred private
suits to enforce NAFTA (or challenge agency action taken to im-
plement a binational panel decision) or to enforce the terms of the
URAA.92
The Court rejected the first argument on the grounds that
plaintiffs' claims do not arise from NAFTA. Instead, pursuant to
the APA, plaintiffs contest the USTR's interpretation of § 129,
which was passed as part of the URAA. The Court thus held that
the jurisdictional bars of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(g) and 3312(c) did not
apply.93 The Court also rejected the government's argument that
19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1) precluded plaintiffs' suit, relying heavily on
the exhaustive analysis of a similar issue in Canadian Lumber Trade
Alliance v. United States.94 The Court held that § 3512 was inappli-
cable because "section 129 is domestic legislation that implements,
but does not approve, the Uruguay Round Agreements." 95 The
Court also noted that "the structure of the URAA is designed to
ensure the participation of all interested parties, including parties
such as Plaintiffs" and refused to infer "that, despite Congress'
clearly expressed intent to promote the participation of interested
foreign parties in the section 129 process, it nevertheless intended
to preclude review of whether the USTR's order to implement the
results of that process is in accordance with law." 96
The Court also concluded that plaintiffs met their burden of
showing that their claims fell within the "zone of interests" of §
129, an additional requirement the courts have imposed on plain-
tiffs bringing suit under the APA, which is derived from the re-
quirement in § 702 that a plaintiff be "adversely affected or ag-
grieved" by the challenged agency action.97 The government had
argued that it alone fell within the zone of interests of § 129, be-
cause the statute "creates only procedures for the Political
Branches to consult with each other in order to frame the United
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 425 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006). See Tembec 1, 441 F. Supp. 2d at
1318-20 (discussing the government's failure to recognize the distinction between
implementing legislation and approving legislation).
95 Tembec 1, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
96 Id. at 1320.
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States' response to adverse WTO reports."98 The Court observed
that "Defendants' argument focuses on the procedural rights cre-
ated by section 129, but misses the proper object of inquiry-the
substantive interests to be protected by those procedural rights."99
In the Court's view, the substantive interest was "ensuring that
new section 129 determinations are implemented in accordance
with U.S. law," and plaintiffs "have a protected interest in the
proper administration of section 129" by virtue of their status as
"interested parties" in trade proceedings who were subject to anti-
dumping and countervailing duty orders.1 00 The Court also re-
jected the government's argument that plaintiffs' claims raised a
political question: "The court is neither called upon to make trade
policy, nor to direct the USTR as to whether any section 129 deter-
mination should be implemented. Rather, the court is merely
asked to determine the bounds of USTR's authority to order im-
plementation." 101
On the merits, the Court held that the language and structure
of § 129, its legislative history and its purpose all supported the
conclusion that Congress had not expressly or impliedly author-
ized the USTR to implement an affirmative ITC determination un-
der § 129.102 In a subsequent opinion, the Court entered final judg-
ment in favor of plaintiffs, and ordered the defendants, among
other things, to revoke all of the orders on softwood lumber, to liq-
uidate all unliquidated entries covered by the orders in accordance
with the ITC negative remand determination, to refund all cash
deposits with accrued interest, and to terminate all ongoing admin-
istrative proceedings related to the orders.103
3.3. Abitibi-Consolidated Inc. v. United States' 04 and Tokyo Kikai
Seisakusho, Ltd. v. United States 05
In Abitibi, plaintiffs challenged Commerce's use of sampling to
select respondents in an administrative review of the antidumping
98 Id. (citation omitted).
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1324-25.
101 Id. at 1327.
102 Id. at 1331-42.
103 Tembec II, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1355.
104 437 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006).
105 403 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2005).
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duty order on imports of softwood lumber products from Can-
ada. 0 6 Due to the large number of companies in the review, Com-
merce decided to limit the number of respondents using a "'prob-
ability proportional to size' sampling method pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677f-l(c)(2)(A)."107 Plaintiffs were not selected, and their volun-
tary responses to Commerce's questionnaires were not examined.
Rather than await the final results of the review, plaintiffs com-
menced a challenge to Commerce's respondent selection, seeking
to direct Commerce to accept plaintiffs as voluntary respondents
or, alternatively, preliminarily enjoin the third review pending se-
lection of a statistically valid sample or selection of the largest ex-
porters and producers.108
Plaintiffs asserted that their action arose under the APA and
that the CIT had jurisdiction over their action under § 1581(i).
However, the CIT denied § 1581(i) jurisdiction and dismissed the
action on ripeness grounds.109 As for plaintiffs' voluntary respon-
dent claim, the CIT held that to obtain certain information neces-
sary for applying the standard of review properly, it "would have
to remand the matter to Commerce and disrupt the administrative
proceeding." 1 ° As for the plaintiffs' sampling claim, the CIT held
that "immediate judicial intervention in the [administrative] re-
view is inappropriate because further development of the adminis-
trative record will enable more efficient judicial review of Com-
merce's sampling methodology than at present.""' Finally, the
CIT rejected plaintiffs' argument that their remedy under § 1581(c)
was manifestly inadequate and concluded that § 1581(c) was the
exclusive means of judicial review for plaintiffs' claim." 2
In another recent case, Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, the CIT reached
the same conclusion as in Abitibi, although the CIT in Tokyo Kikai
Seisakusho grounded its rationale for denying § 1581(i) jurisdiction
more explicitly in the APA jurisprudence." 3 In Tokyo Kikai Seisaku-
106 Abitibi, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 1354.
107 Id. at 1355.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1357-58.
110 Id. at 1359.
111 Id. at 1360.
112 Id. at 1360-62.
113 See Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 1292-93 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2005)
(discussing the court's decision to "construe the complaint to bring an action un-
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sho, the CIT denied § 1581(i) jurisdiction over a challenge to the
self-initiation and continuation by Commerce of an antidumping
changed circumstance review. In that case, following the receipt of
information developed at a civil trial in a U.S. district court indicat-
ing that certain Japanese producers of large newspaper printing
presses were engaged in fraudulent pricing behaviors, Commerce
initiated the antidumping changed circumstance review despite
the fact that there was no antidumping duty order in place with re-
spect to those Japanese producers.1 14 The Japanese producers
brought suit against Commerce, challenging Commerce's authority
to self-initiate the changed circumstance review and seeking to en-
join Commerce from continuing the review.115
The plaintiffs invoked § 1581(i) jurisdiction. In addressing the
jurisdiction issue, the CIT first determined that, "[a]lthough its
wording is less than clear in specifying its cause of action, plain-
tiffs' complaint can be construed to bring a civil action against the
United States under the Administrative Procedure Act." 116 How-
ever, noting that the APA only authorizes suits against final agency
actions, the CIT concluded that the "plaintiffs' challenge to the
agency action [was] not yet fit for judicial decision because Com-
merce's initiation of the changed circumstances review [was] a pre-
liminary agency action."117 Furthermore, the CIT held that with-
holding court consideration would not cause a hardship to
plaintiffs because participation in the changed circumstances re-
view only required that plaintiffs file a brief as an interested party
in the proceeding, which was "not a significant burden." 118 There-
fore, the CIT denied § 1581(i) jurisdiction and dismissed the action.
The outcomes in Abitibi and Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho illustrate the
heavy burden plaintiffs face when trying to use § 1581(i) jurisdic-
tion to challenge Commerce action in an antidumping or counter-
vailing duty proceeding prior to the issuance of the final determi-
nation. As reflected in the CIT's opinions in these two cases, the
CIT's willingness to entertain such claims under its § 1581(i) juris-
diction hinges on its assessment of the ripeness of the claims and
der the APA").
114 Id. at 1288.
115 Id. at 1288-89.
116 Id. at 1292.
117 Id. at 1293.
118 Id.
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whether relief available under other subsections of § 1581 after the
completion of the proceeding would be manifestly inadequate, two
hurdles that plaintiffs rarely are able to overcome.
3.4. The Byrd Amendment Cases
In 2006, the CIT issued several decisions in cases raising claims
implicating the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act
("Byrd Amendment"). Representative cases are Canadian Lumber
Trade Alliance v. United States," 9 PS Chez Sidney, LLC v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n,120 and SKF USA Inc. v. United States.121
In Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance, Canadian exporters and the
Government of Canada brought an APA claim challenging Cus-
toms' distribution under the Byrd Amendment of antidumping
and countervailing duties imposed on imports from Canada as vio-
lating § 408 of the NAFTA Implementation Act. 122 That provision
provides that "[a]ny amendment... [to] title VII of the Tariff Act
of 1930 [19 U.S.C. §§ 1671 et seq.], or any successor statute... shall
apply to goods from a NAFTA country only to the extent specified
in the amendment." 123 Canadian exporters contended that, since
the Byrd Amendment amended Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930
but failed to specify its applicability to Canada or Mexico, it should
not be applicable to goods from Canada and Mexico.
124
The CIT first held it had jurisdiction under § 1581(i) to hear the
Canadian parties' claim, and Canadian exporters, but not the Gov-
ernment of Canada, had standing to state a cause of action under
the APA. 125 As for the merits, the CIT found that the application of
the Byrd Amendment to Canadian and Mexican goods conflicted
with the express language of 19 U.S.C. § 3438.126 The CIT held that
the Byrd Amendment, when read in light of § 3438, authorizes dis-
tribution to be made from duties collected pursuant to antidump-
ing and countervailing duty orders, except for duty orders on
119 425 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006).
120 442 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006).
121 451 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006).
122 Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 1321.
123 19 U.S.C. § 3438 (2000).
124 Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 1330.
125 Id. at 1335-52.
126 Id. at 1363, 1366.
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goods from Canada and Mexico. 127 Accordingly, it entered a de-
claratory judgment that the Byrd Amendment did not apply to
goods from Canada and Mexico and permanently enjoined Cus-
toms from distributing any further duties derived from the orders
on softwood lumber, hard red spring wheat, and magnesium from
Canada. 12
8
In PS Chez Sidney, the plaintiff -a domestic crawfish pro-
ducer- indicated in a preliminary questionnaire that it supported a
petition for an antidumping investigation of crawfish imports but
indicated in a final questionnaire that it took no position on the in-
vestigation.129 The ITC and Customs determined that the producer
was not an affected domestic producer entitled to distribution un-
der the Byrd Amendment because it did not indicate its support for
the antidumping investigation. The plaintiff brought suit before
the CIT challenging the agencies' determinations.
After its non-constitutional arguments were rejected by the
CIT, the plaintiff challenged the Byrd Amendment as violating the
First Amendment of the Constitution, as it was denied the gov-
ernment subsidy based on its opinion expressed in the question-
naire. The CIT first held that it had § 1581(i) jurisdiction to hear the
plaintiff's constitutional arguments. 30 After going through an ex-
haustive First Amendment analysis, the Court held that, under
strict scrutiny, the requirement for an expression of support for an-
tidumping investigations as a condition for receipt of government
benefits was facially unconstitutional.131
In SKF USA, another case challenging the Byrd Amendment on
constitutional grounds, the ITC and Customs determined that
plaintiff, a domestic producer, was not an "affected domestic pro-
ducer" within the meaning of the Byrd Amendment because it had
opposed the petition in its questionnaire response in the original
antidumping duty investigation. 32 Plaintiff challenged the deter-
mination on the grounds that the Byrd Amendment violated the
plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment and the Due Process
and Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution.
127 Id. at 1373.
128 Id.
129 PS Chez Sidney, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1331.
130 Id. at 1333.
131 Id. at 1340-59.
132 SKF USA, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1356.
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The CIT first held that it had jurisdiction over the case under §
1581(i), and that the standard of review of the APA was applica-
ble. 133 The CIT went on to hold that the requirement in the Byrd
Amendment that an entity such as SKF USA had to support an an-
tidumping petition to be included as an "affected domestic pro-
ducer" violates the Equal Protection guarantee of the Constitution,
as the classification "treats similarly situated domestic producers
differently and is not rationally related to a legitimate government
objective." 134 After striking down the provision defining "affected
domestic producer" as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution, the Court found it unnecessary to address plaintiff's
other constitutional arguments and proceeded to remedies. 135 With
respect to the question of remedy, the Court found the unconstitu-
tional provision severable from the Byrd Amendment and re-
manded the matter back to the ITC and Customs for review of their
decisions in accordance with its opinion.
136
4. THE FUTURE OF APA CLAIMS BEFORE THE CIT
As the above analysis has shown, there is a compelling argu-
ment that virtually all claims heard by the CIT under its § 1581(i)
jurisdiction are APA claims, despite the fact that plaintiffs in their
complaints and the CIT in its decisions rarely acknowledge it so
explicitly. Thus, although the number of § 1581(i) cases explicitly
raising APA claims has increased lately, it is difficult to read too
much into that trend. Similarly, although the number of § 1581(i)
cases filed at the CIT in recent years seems to have increased a sub-
stantial amount, it is difficult to attribute too much significance to
this apparent trend given the relatively large number of § 1581(i)
cases triggered by just two events: 1) the imposition of the anti-
dumping and countervailing duty orders on softwood lumber
from Canada; and 2) the enactment of the Byrd Amendment.
When these cases are excluded from the calculus, there does not
appear to be a statistically significant increase in the number of §
1581(i) cases on the Court's docket in recent years.
In the authors' view, however, the Federal Circuit's decision in
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1366.
135 Id. at 1362.
136 Id. at 1364.
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Shinyei is a seminal case that could significantly change the land-
scape of litigation under the Court's residual jurisdiction in the fu-
ture for two reasons. First, the Court unambiguously reaffirmed
its decision in Consolidated Bearings that challenges to Customs' liq-
uidation instructions are distinct from challenges to the underlying
antidumping or countervailing duty determinations. Furthermore,
the Court reaffirmed that plaintiffs can bring APA claims seeking
reliquidation under § 1581(i). Given the relative frequency with
which erroneous or unlawful liquidation instructions are issued,
the Federal Circuit's holding that liquidation does not make moot a
plaintiff's cause of action should lead to court challenges in cir-
cumstances that most practitioners previously would have con-
cluded lacked any foundation. The Federal Circuit's recent deci-
sion in Mukand unambiguously reaffirmed the holding in Shinyei
that a plaintiff's failure to seek injunctive relief prior to liquidation
did not divest the CIT of jurisdiction over reliquidation claims,
while at the same time arguably narrowing the instances in which
such reliquidation claims are likely to prevail on the merits. Sec-
ond, and more generally, the Federal Circuit's emphasis in Shinyei
that under the APA agency action must be "in accordance with
law," and that "law" includes the binding decisions of this Court
and the Federal Circuit-a reminder one would not have consid-
ered necessary - may give potential litigants added confidence that
legitimate claims of unlawful agency conduct will not be dismissed
quite as quickly by the CIT as they may have been in the past. The
CIT's decision in Jilin is perhaps the best illustration of a subse-
quent decision embracing that aspect of the Federal Circuit's deci-
sion in Shinyei.
In the future, the CIT also is likely to see more APA claims un-
der its § 1581(i) jurisdiction as questions arise regarding the ad-
ministration and enforcement of both existing and new trade legis-
lation that does not specifically provide for judicial review by the
CIT. One would expect, for example, that given the proliferation of
WTO challenges to determinations of the ITC and Commerce De-
partment, that Tembec will not be the only instance in which the
CIT is called upon to address the scope of the USTR's authority
under § 129, and that it will confront in particular questions re-
garding the implementation of § 129 determinations issued by
Commerce.
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